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Pursuant to rule 24 (c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Labor
Commission submits this reply to the brief of appellees Frito Lay and
Transcontinental Insurance Company ("Frito Lay" hereafter.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I: FRITO LAY HAS MISCHARACTERIZED
MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING MS. CLAUSING'S CLAIM
FOR TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION.
Ms. Clausing's reply brief has corrected Frito Lay's assertion that Ms.
Clausing's counsel misled Frito Lay and "intentionally misinterpreted" Judge
Sessions' order. The Labor Commission agrees with Ms. Clausing's reply and
will not further address that point. Instead, this brief will focus on several material
errors contained in Frito Lay's brief, as follows:

1) Whether a prior decision

issued by Judge Eblen had the effect of resolving Ms. Clausing's claim for
temporary disability compensation; 2) The amount of temporary disability
compensation that is due Ms. Clausing under the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act; and 3) Frito Lay's right to obtain Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions'
award of compensation to Ms. Clausing.
Judge Eblen's prior decision.

Frito-Lay asserts that Judge Eblen's

decision of October 22, 2002, issued in an earlier claim filed by Ms. Clausing,
resolved Ms. Clausing's claims for temporary disability compensation. (Frito Lay
brief at page 6, paragraph 2, and page 10.) However, by its plain language, Judge
Eblen's decision was limited to permanent disability compensation and did not
address Ms. Clausing's claim to temporary disability compensation.
1

(Judge

Eblen's decision, R. at 182 to 186.) Furthermore, Frito Lay's conduct in this
proceeding shows that not even Frito Lay viewed Judge Eblen's decision as
having resolved Ms. Clausing's claim to temporary disability compensation.
•

Commission Rule R602-2.C.21 required Frito Lay to raise all affirmative
defenses in its answer to Ms. Clausing's claim. If it were true, as Frito Lay
now asserts, that: 1) the parties reached an agreement to Ms. Clausing's
temporary disability claims in the proceedings before Judge Eblen; 2) Judge
Eblen incorporated that agreement in her order; and 3) Frito Lay paid the
compensation due under the purported agreement and Judge Eblen's order,
then it follows that Frito Lay would have raised affirmative defenses of
"accord and satisfaction" and "res judicata" in the answer it filed in this
case. But Frito Lay raised neither of those affirmative defenses. (See Frito
Lay's answer, R. at 11 through 14.)

•

Prior to the date set for evidentiary hearing in this matter, Frito Lay
submitted a pretrial disclosure statement to Judge Sessions and opposing
counsel. The pretrial statement did not assert that Ms. Clausing's claims
for temporary disability compensation had already been resolved in the
earlier proceedings before Judge Eblen. Instead, Frito Lay's prehearing
1

Rule 602-2.C.2 provides as follows (emphasis added): "The answer shall
admit or deny liability for the claim and shall state the reasons liability is
denied. The answer shall state ail affirmative defenses with sufficient
accuracy and detail that the petitioner and the Division may be fully
informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted.
2

disclosure stated that Frito Lay intended ". . . to litigate the appropriateness
of temporary total compensation and temporary partial compensation as
there is no indication that [Ms. Clausing] missed any time from work."
(Frito Lay's prehearing disclosure; R. at 18.)
•

Frito Lay and Ms. Clausing submitted stipulated facts to Judge Sessions in
lieu of an evidentiary hearing. This stipulation did not indicate that Ms.
Clausing's claims for temporary disability compensation had been resolved
by previous agreement or by Judge Eblen's earlier decision. (R. 73 through
79.)
In summary, the plain language of Judge Eblen's order, as well as Frito

Lay's conduct in this proceeding, belie Frito Lay's contention that Judge Eblen's
decision

had

resolved

Ms.

Clausing's

claim

for

temporary

disability

compensation. To the contrary, the extent and duration of Ms. Clausing's right to
temporary disability compensation was an issue that Judge Sessions was required
to resolve as part of his decision of September 23, 2005.
Temporary disability compensation due Ms. Clausing.

Without any

explanation, Frito-Lay states that its liability for Ms. Clausing's temporary
disability compensation could not exceed $4,451.18.

This is incorrect.

As

explained below, the Labor Commission believes that Ms. Clausing is entitled to
temporary disability compensation totaling $92,956.46, plus interest.
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act establishes two types of temporary
disability compensation:
3

•

Temporary total disability compensation. Pursuant to § 34A-2-410 of
the Act, an injured worker is entitled to temporary total disability
compensation beginning when work-related injuries prevent the worker
from performing "duties of the character required in his occupation prior to
his injury." Entwhistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P. 2d 495, 498 (Utah 1981).
Section 34A-2-410(l) fixes the amount of such compensation at two-thirds
of the worker's weekly pre-injury earnings, plus $5 allowances for a spouse
and up to four dependent children, but not more than 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of injury.

Temporary total disability

compensation stops when the injured worker reaches medical stability.
Booms v. Rapp, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986).
•

Temporary partial disability compensation.

Under § 34A-2-411, an

injured worker who cannot perform his or her regular work duties, but can
perform light duty work, is entitled to temporary partial disability
compensation.

The amount of this compensation is two-thirds of the

difference between pre-injury and post-injury earnings, plus $5 allowances
for spouse and children, limited to 100% of the state average weekly wage
and ending when the worker reaches medical stability.
Ms. Clausing earned $900 per week prior to injury.

The state average

weekly wage was $447 on the date of her injury. Consequently, under the terms
of § 410 and § 411, Ms. Clausing was entitled to a disability benefit of $447 for
those weeks when she was either physically unable to work or no light duty work
4

was available for her.2 Ms. Clausing could earn up to $259.50 per week with no
reduction to her disability benefit; in weeks when she earned more than $259.50
she was entitled to a reduced compensation amount.
Ms. Clausing's work accident on March 18, 1999, and the related accident
on May 21, 2001, resulted in injuries to her knees, low back and right arm.
(Stipulation, R. 74, paragraphs 2 and 5.) Because these injuries prevented Ms.
Clausing from performing her regular work duties at Frito-Lay, she was entitled to
begin receiving temporary disability compensation on March
(Stipulation, R. 74, paragraphs 2 and 5.)

18, 1999.

Her right to temporary disability

compensation did not end until June 10, 2004, when she reached medical stability
from her work injuries.

(Report of independent medical panel; R. at 116,

paragraph 1; also R. at 117, paragraph 2.) Thus, Ms. Clausing was entitled to
either temporary total disability compensation or temporary partial disability
compensation between those dates.3 Ms. Clausing's letter of December 1, 2005, to

2

See § 34A-2-410(2): "In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior
to the employee reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty
employment is available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability
benefits shall continue to be paid." (Emphasis added.)
3
The parties' stipulation (R. 73 to 79) states that Ms. Clausing could not work for
9.43 weeks while she recovered from knee surgeries. During the times when she
was physically able to perform light duty work, there were 43 weeks when no such
work was available. During 48.57 weeks, her light duty earnings were less than
$259.50 and did not warrant any reduction in her disability compensation. Thus,
Ms. Clausing is entitled to payment of $447 for each of these weeks. During an
additional 172.42 weeks, Ms. Clausing earned sufficient wages from light duty
work to require a partial reduction in her weekly compensation amount.
5

Frito-Lay's counsel correctly computes the principal sum of such compensation,
exclusive of interest, at $92,956.46 (R. 214 to 222).
Frito Lav's opportunity to obtain Appeals Board review.

Frito Lay

asserts that it could not request Appeals Board review of the temporary disability
compensation awarded by Judge Sessions' order of September 23, 2005, until after
Judge Sessions denied Frito Lay's rule 60 (b) motion on March 17, 2006. (Frito
Lay's brief at page 14.) This assertion is incorrect under the plain language of §
34A-2-801 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act:
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an
administrative law judge in accordance with Subsection (3), the
decision of an administrative law judge . . . is a final order of the
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an
administrative law judge by filing a motion for review . . . within 30
days of the date the decision is issued.
Under the foregoing statute, Frito Lay not only had a right to obtain review
of Judge Sessions' award of temporary disability compensation, but had a duty to
request review within 30 days in order to prevent the award from becoming final.
Judge Sessions' order of September 23, 2005, fully informed Frito Lay of its right
to appeal, as follows (emphasis added):
A party aggrieved by this decision may file a Motion for
Review with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor
Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then
submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of
the date of the Motion for Review.

6

POINT II:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GRANTING RELIEF TO FRITO LAY ON ISSUES THAT
HAD NEVER BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE APPEALS
BOARD,
The Labor Commission's initial brief points out that Frito Lay never argued
to the Appeals Board that Frito Lay was entitled to relief from Judge Sessions'
order of September 23, 2005, pursuant to rule 60 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In response, Frito Lay's brief asserts that rule 60 (a), which allows
correction of clerical mistakes, was properly before the Appeals Board because
"[t]he content of [Frito Lay's] motion for review makes clear that . . . the ALJ's
order must have been a consequence of a clerical error."
The Commission disagrees. A careful reading of the motion for review that
Frito Lay submitted to the Appeals Board reveals that Frito Lay never mentioned
rule 60 (a) as a basis for relief and never asserted that Judge Sessions had made a
"clerical error."
The Commission's initial brief also points out that Frito Lay never argued
to the Appeals Board that the Board should: 1) construe the rule 60 (b) motion
Frito Lay had filed with Judge Sessions on December 21, 2005, as a motion for
Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' September 23, 2005, order; and then 2)
treat this fictional "motion for review" as having been timely filed through
application of the "discovery" rule.
Frito Lay's response to these points is merely to assert that it did file a
motion for review; therefore its motion for review was properly before the

7

Appeals Board.

(See Frito Lay's brief, page 13, paragraph A.)

But such a

response misses the point. The question is not whether Frito Lay filed a motion
for review—clearly it did. Rather, the question is: What issues did Frito Lay raise
in its motion for review?
Frito Lay's motion for review to the Appeals Board raised one argument—
that Judge Session's order of March 17, 2006, improperly denied Frito Lay's 60
(b) motion. (R. at 338 through 357.) Nothing in Frito Lay's motion for review
requested that the Board treat the 60 (b) motion that Frito Lay had filed with Judge
Sessions as a timely motion for Appeals Board review. Nor did Frito Lay ask the
Appeals Board to correct Judge Sessions' award of temporary disability
compensation by exercising continuing jurisdiction pursuant to § 34A-2-420(l).
Frito Lay's failure to raise any of the foregoing issues before the Appeals
Board goes to the heart of the dispute that is now before this Court. Frito Lay was
entitled to review of Judge Sessions' decision, but Frito Lay was obligated to state
the grounds for review.

See § 63G-4-301(l) (b) (ii), Utah Administrative

Procedures Act. And while Frito Lay also was entitled to judicial review of the
Appeals Board's decision, §63G-4-401(2) explicitly conditions such review upon
Frito Lay having exhausted "all administrative remedies available." This Court
has held that " . . . issues not raised in proceedings before administrative agencies
are not subject to judicial review . . . ." Sullivan v. Utah Board of Oil Gas and
Mining, et al, 189 P.3d 63, 67 (Utah 2008). It is also well established that the

8

Appeals Board itself may not itself raise an issue that was not raised by the parties.
Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Commission, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1995).
The Court of Appeals5 decision in this case overlooked or ignored the
foregoing statutes and precedents, and excuses Frito Lay from its obligation of
identifying the issues it wishes the Appeals Board to consider before it can present
those issues for appellate judicial review.

If allowed to stand, the Court of

Appeals' decision will have the following possible outcomes:
•

Regardless of what issues a party has actually raised in a motion for review,
the Appeals Board must attempt to identify all issues a party could have
raised, and then rule on those issues; or

•

The appellate courts must entertain whatever issues are presented on
petition for review, whether or not those issues were presented in the course
of the Labor Commission's adjudicative process.
Either of these outcomes is untenable. Not only are they contrary to statute

and precedent, but they also would preclude the orderly and predictable
adjudication of workers' compensation claims.
POINT III. FRITO LAY HAS ABANDONED THE ONLY
ISSUE THAT IT DID RAISE BEFORE THE APPEALS
BOARD—ITS PURPORTED RIGHT TO RELIEF UNDER
RULE 60 (b).
As already noted, there was one issue that Frito Lay did raise before the
Appeals Board and was properly before the Court of Appeals—the question of
whether rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was applicable to the
9

Labor Commission's administrative adjudicative proceedings.

The Court of

Appeals held that rule 60 (b) was applicable, and the Commission's principal brief
has explained why the Commission believes the Court of Appeals' decision is
wrong. Interestingly, Frito Lay's responsive brief does not defend the Court of
Appeals' decision, but instead engages in a subtle shift in its argument.
Specifically, Frito Lay does not argue that it was entitled to relief pursuant to rule
60 (b) itself, but rather, that it was entitled to relief under "the same principles" as
in rule 60 (b)." (Frito Lay brief, page 17.) From that jumping-off point, Frito Lay
circles back to its arguments regarding Appeals Board authority to correct errors
under other sources of authority, such as continuing jurisdiction under § 420(1) of
the Act.
Point II of this brief has already addressed the fact that Frito Lay failed to
raise any alternative grounds for relief in the motion for review if filed with the
Appeals Board. And in light of Frito Lay's abandonment of its previous position
that rule 60 (b) is applicable here, the Commission believes there is no need to
augment the discussion of this issue beyond what was presented in the
Commission's primary brief.
CONCLUSION
In simple terms, Frito Lay ignored the plain language of Judge Sessions'
order and failed to make use of the simple and efficient methods established by the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act to
obtain full agency review of that order. Perhaps in an effort to extricate Frito Lay
10

from what the Court of Appeals wrongly perceived to be the extreme
consequences of Frito Lay's inaction, the Court of Appeals ignored statutory and
precedential "exhaustion of remedies" requirements and considered issues that
Frito Lay raised for the first time on appeal.
The Court of Appeals' decision, if allowed to stand, will have negative
consequences on the Labor Commission's ability to adjudicate future workers'
compensation claims.
•

First, confusion and uncertainty will result from adding the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure as an overlay to already-existing procedural rules
established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.

•

Second, the Commission will be forced to identify and rule on issues never
raised by the parties themselves, and the appellate courts will be required to
address issues as part of the appellate review process that were never
considered in the Commission's adjudicative proceedings.
The Commission therefore respectfully requests this Court to reverse the

majority decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Labor
Commission's Appeals Board.
Dated this 15th day of April, 2009.

/\ulJ*— W
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